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The impact of Sovereign Wealth Fund investments on the 





In this study, we attempt to shed some light on the effects of SWF 
investment  activities  by  analyzing  the  short-term  impact  of  SWF 
investments on the performance of those companies in which they 
invest. We collect both direct and indirect data on equity investments 
for  each  SWF.  The  sample  consists  of  60  investments  by  11 
important  SWFs  from  around  the  world  (SWF  of  the  United  Arab 
Emirates,  China,  Kuwait,  Russia,  France,  Singapore…)  during  the 
period  2003  to  2009.  To  quantify  the  valuation  effects  of  SWF 
investments,  we  use  the  event  study  methodology  to  estimate 
abnormal returns to the shares around the times that news of the 
transactions of SWFs becomes publicly available. We find that the 
announcement  effect  of  SWF  investments  in  listed  companies  is 
positive and the level of transparency of SWFs influence the positive 
impact of SWF investments on the performance of those companies 
in which they invest.  
 
Keywords: Sovereign wealth funds, performance, event study. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) offer a variety of economic and financial benefits. 
SWFs  are  special  investment  funds  created  or  owned  by  a  government  to  hold 
foreign  assets  for  long  term  purposes.  Their  rapid  growth  in  recent  years  has 
prompted  concern  among  economists.  Yet,  there  has  been  very  little  academic 
research in this domain. Recently, the popular press and the general public have 
both become extremely active in discussing the potential impact of SWFs.  
 
Several empirical studies find the positive impact of SWF investments on the values 
of  the  companies  in  which  they  invest  (Chhaochharia  and  Laeven,  2008;  Fotak, 
Bortolotti  and  Megginson,  2008);   Kotter  and  Lel,  2008;  Dewenter,  Han  and 
Malatesta,  2009…).  However,  some  economists  worry  about  the  investments  of 
SWFs. It may be that the market reacts negatively to the announcements of SWF 
investments.  This  argument  assumes  that  SWFs  may  impose  the  goals  and  the 
priorities  that  are not consistent  with  the  maximization  of  the  profitability  of firms, 
creating a high agency costs and a fall of the firm value.  
 
Taking account of these contradictions, we analyze the impact of SWF investments 
on the performance of the firms. However, because of the difficulty in collecting the 
data,  we  consider  only  the  immediate  impact  of  SWF  investments  on  the 
performance of the firms. We seek to test whether the effect of SWF investments in 
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companies on balance creates or reduces value by examining the returns to target 
firm shareholders subsequent to these investments. Our results are consistent with 
those of the previous studies. They contribute to the empirical studies that confirm 
the positive impact of SWF investments on the performance of the companies.  
 
Firstly, a literature review resume the results of the previous researches that examine 
the  market  reaction  to  announcements  of  investments  by  SWFs.  After  that,  we 
explain the methodology and the data of our research. Finally, the empirical results 
and the conclusions about the impact of SWFs investments on the performance of 
the companies are presented.  
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
SWFs are defined as special purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by 
the  general  government.  Created  by  the  general  government  for  macroeconomic 
purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, 
and employ a set of investment strategies which include investing in foreign financial 
assets. The SWFs are commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses, 
official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, 
and/or  receipts  resulting  from  commodity  exports.  (International  working  group  of 
SWFs – IWG). 
 
There  has  been  some  empirical  research  to  examine  the  impact  of  SWFs 
investments  on  firm  values.  Chhaochharia  and  Laeven  (2008) show  that  the 
announcement effect of SWFs investments in listed equities is positive. They find that 
share  prices  of firms respond favorably  when  SWFs buy  stakes,  in  part  because 
these investments happen when firms are in financial distress. However, the long-run 
performance  of  equity  investments  by  SWFs  tends  to  be  poor,  coherent  with 
imperfect  portfolio  diversification  and  poor  corporate  governance.  Fotak,  Bortolotti 
and Megginson (2008) obtain similar results about the announcement effect of SWFs 
investments.  In  fact,  they  consider  that  stocks  of  targeted  firm  exhibit  positive 
abnormal returns when the SWF investments is announced and they explain this as 
evidence that investors appear to welcome SWFs. Their results document that the 
greater  the  share  of  the  firm  acquired  by  the  SWF  and  the  greater  the  level  of 
transparency of the funds itself, the positive reaction is stronger. They also find that 
SWFs are associated with deteriorating firm performance over two years subsequent 
to the initial SWF investment. They conclude that SWFs have a negative impact on 
firm profitability in the long term, perhaps by imposing additional agency costs.  
 
Kotter and Lel (2008) show that the market reacts positively to announcements of 
investments  by  SWFs,  because  of  SWFs  investments  in  firms  facing  financial 
difficulties and the information generation of stock selection by the funds. They also 
find that the degree of SWF transparency is related to the market reaction. However, 
they  document  that  SWF  investments  do  not  significantly  impact  target  firms 
profitability,  growth  and  governance  in  the  three-year  following  the  investment. 
Dewenter, Han and Malatesta (2009) find positive market reactions to acquisitions 
announcement and negative to divestment announcement of SWFs. In a long-term 
analysis, the hypothesis that stocks bought and sold by SWFs earn normal returns 










































Fernandes (2009) and Sojli Tham (2010) are different with the previous. In fact, Nuno 
Fernandes (2009) finds that firms which have higher SWFs ownership have higher 
firm  valuations  and  better  operating  performance  and  SWFs  contribute  to  create 
long-term shareholder value. Sojli Tham (2010) also finds that in the short-term, the 
markets  welcome  SWFs  investments  and  in  the  long-term  the  level  of 
internationalization  and  Tobin’s  q  of  the  firms  increase  substantially  after  SWF 
investments. 
 
We find that several studies examine the impact of SWF investments on the values of 
the companies but don’t analyse clearly the influence of the level of transparency of 
SWFs on the market reaction to the announcements of SWFs investments. In this 
study, the principal hypothese that we want to test is : The market reacts favorably to 
the announcements of SWFs investments and the level of transparency of SWFs 
influence the positive reaction of the announcement of the SWFs acquisition on the 
share prices of the companies.   
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
To  quantify  the  valuation  effects  of  SWF  investments,  we  use  the  event  study 
methodology to estimate abnormal returns of the shares around the times that news 
of the transactions of SWFs becomes publicly available. For these transactions, we 
searched  both  the  Factiva  and  Lexis  Nexis  new  source  databases  to  obtain  the 
announcement  dat  es.  The  final  sample  consists  of  60  investments  in  listed 
companies by 11 important SWFs of 6 countries around the world during the period 
2003 to 2009. 
 
Table 1: Sovereign wealth funds and the number of observations 
 
Sovereign Wealth Funds  Number of 
observations 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC)  14 
Temasek Holdings – Singapore  10 
China Investment Corporation (CIC)  9 
Strategic Investment Fund – France  9 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA)  5 
SAFE Investment Company – China  4 
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA)  3 
Qatar Investment Authority (QIA)  2 
Investment Corporation of Dubai (ICD)   2 
Dubai World Holdings Ltd –UAE  1 
Mubadala Development Company - UAE Abu Dhabi  1 
Total  60 
 
After selecting a sample for our study, we collected the data necessary to perform an 
event  study  methodology.  Using  the  Datastream  database,  we  obtained  the  daily 
stock price of target firms to calculate the return of the company. For the return of the 











































The following steps are taken for implementing the event study:  
-  Identification of the event window 
We examine different event windows [t - 10, t + 5], [t - 3, t + 3], [t - 1, t + 1], [t + 2, t + 
10] … over the period [t - 40, t + 20]. Let t = 0 represent the time of the event.  
-  Determination of a expected return of the security i for time t during the 
event window in the absence of the event (Kit) 
We use a simple market model to estimate coefficient α and β of firms: 
Rit = αi + βiRMt + ɛit   t € IN     
For each event, the market model is estimated over the period 400 to 50 trading days 
prior to the event date.  
Then, the expected return Kit is estimated for time t during the event window: 
Kit = αi + βiRMt     t € I 
-  Calculation of the abnormal return within the event window 
We calculate the abnormal returns by differencing the observed return Rit and the 
expected return Kit: 
                       =     -      
-  Calculation  of  the  average  abnormal  return  (AAR)  and  the  cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR):  
Given N events (a total of 60 in the entire sample), the sample average aggregated 
abnormal return for period t is: 
                                       =  
 
 ∑     
 
     
The  average  abnormal  return  can  then  be  aggregated  over  the  event  window  to 
calculate the cumulative average abnormal return for each firm i :  
                                        ,  =  ∑     
  
      
-  Testing whether the abnormal return is statistically different from 0  
We  use  Student’s  t-test  to  test  whether  the  average  abnormal  return  and  the 
cumulative average abnormal return are statistically different from 0. 
 
To analyze whether the level of transparency of sovereign wealth funds influence the 
relation between stock returns and sovereign wealth funds investments, we use also 
the event study methodology for three groups of samples depending on the level of 
transparency.  This  new  approach  helps  to  analyze  clearly  the  influence  of 
transparency  of  SWFs  on  the  market  reaction  to  the  announcements  of  SWFs 
investments, for which the previous studies didn’t pay attention.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
Table 2 presents the average abnormal returns for the event window (-10, 10). The 
results indicate that, at the date t = -1 and t = 0, the AAR is significantly positive. 
These results show that the relations between the stocks return and sovereign wealth 


















































Tableau 2: Average Abnormal Return and the Student’s t-test 
 
Date  AAR (%)  CAAR (%)  t -test -AAR  Pr > |t| 
-10  -0.29616  -2.95100  -0.96  0.3391 
-9  0.106775  -2.84423  0.34  0.7356 
-8  -0.13847  -2.9827  -0.47  0.6396 
-7  0.74032  -2.24238  1.72*  0.0909 
-6  0.23375  -2.00863  0.68  0.5010 
-5  0.07940  -1.92923  0.25  0.8057 
-4  0.19096  -1.73827  0.57  0.5685 
-3  -0.61818  -2.35645  -2.61  0.0114 
-2  0.26896  -2.08749  1.27  0.2108 
-1  0.59304  -1.49445  1.96*  0.0548 
0  0.67257  -0.82188  1.73*  0.0885 
1  -0.03616  -0.85803  -0.09  0.9258 
2  0.18735  -0.67069  0.49  0.6242 
3  -0.21956  -0.89025  -0.61  0.5412 
4  0.63060  -0.25965  1.70*  0.0938 
5  0.50138  0.24173  1.51  0.1352 
6  0.11925  0.36098  0.45  0.6513 
7  -0.14534  0.21564  -0.54  0.5937 
8  -0.06967  0.14597  -0.22  0.8259 
9  0.19337  0.33934  0.66  0.5138 
10  0.25838  0.59772  0.67  0.5025 
 
* represent significance at the10% 
 
 
The  Table  3  reports  the  cumulative  average  abnormal  return  for  different  event 
windows over the period (t - 40, t + 20). The results indicate that sovereign wealth 
funds investment generate substantial and positive CAAR during the two trading days 
before  and  after  the  announcement  of  the  investment.  The  average  five-day 
cumulative abnormal returns are 1.69 percent for a (-2, +2) window and 1.23 for a (-
1, +1) window. It means that around the announcement date, the impact of sovereign 





















































Tableau 3: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return and the Student’s t-test 
 
Event windows  CAAR (%)  t -test - CAAR 
(-40,-20)  -0.71331  -0.64 
(-20,-10)  -2.42401  -2.38 
(-10,-5)  0.72561  0.92 
(-5,2)  1.33795  1.24 
(-3,3)  0.84802  0.90 
(-2,2)  1.68576  1.98* 
(-1,1)  1.22945  1.84* 
(2,10)  1.45575  1.26 
(-20,10)  1.12471  0.53 
(10,20)  0.07251  0.05 
(-40,20)  0.41185  0.13 
 
* represent significance at the10% 
 
We  find  that  our  results  support  the  hypothesis  proposed  :  the  market  reacts 
favorably to the announcements of SWFs investments. They are consistent with the 
previous studies that conclude the announcement effect of sovereign wealth funds 
investment in companies is positive. Ours estimates of announcement period CAAR 
for  the  investment  sample  exceed  those  of  Chhaochharia  &  Laeven  (2008)  and 
Fotak,  Bortolotti  &  Megginson  (2008).  The  former  study  reports  a  CAAR  of  0.82 
percent for a (-2, +2) and 0.55 percent for a (-1, +1) window. However, our results are 
lower than those of Kotter & Lel (2008) and Dewenter, Han & Malatesta (2009). The 
results  of  these  authors  present  a  CAAR of  2.43 percent for  a  (-2,  +2)  and 2.15 
percent or 1.7 percent for a (-1, +1) window.  
 
Table 4: Results of the previous studies 
Authors  Event windows  CAAR (%) 
Chhaochharia & Laeven (2008)  (-2, 2)  0.82 
Fotak, Bortolotti & Megginson (2008)  (-1, 1)  0.55 
Kotter & Lel (2008)  (-2, 2)  2.43 
(-1, 1)  2.15 
Dewenter, Han & Malatesta (2009)  (-1, 1)  1.7 
 































































·  Transparency  of  SWFs  and  the  impact  of  SWF  investments  on  the 
performance of the companies 
 
We continue to analyze whether the level of transparency of sovereign wealth funds 
influence  the  positive  relation  between  stock  returns  and  sovereign  wealth  funds 
acquisitions at the announcement date. We group and examine the investment of 
sovereign  wealth  funds  having  different  level  of  transparency.  We  use  the  index 
Linaburg-Maduell  of  the  Sovereign  Wealth  fund  Institute  as  a  measure  for  the 
transparency of sovereign wealth funds.  
 
We divide the sample into three groups depending on the level of transparency:  
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Group 2: Investment of sovereign wealth funds having the normal transparency (6 
and 7) 
Group 3: Investment of sovereign wealth funds having the low transparency (less 
than 6) 
 
Table 5: Transparency of the sovereign wealth funds and the sample 
 









Temasek Holdings – Singapore  8  10  10 
Mubadala Development Company - UAE Abu 
Dhabi  7  10  1 
Group 1 (from 8 to 10)       11 
Government  of  Singapore  Investment 
Corporation  6  6  14 
China Investment Corporation (CIC)  6  6  9 
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA)  6  6  3 
Group 2 (6 and 7)       26 
Qatar Investment Authority (QIA)  5  5  2 
Investment Corporation of Dubai  4  4  2 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority  3  3  5 
SAFE Investment Company – China  2  2  4 
Group 3 (less than 6)       13 
Dubai World Holdings Ltd –UAE  N/A  N/A  1 
Strategic Investment Fund – France  New  New  9 
Total      60 
 
 
We use the event study method and the same steps for the new sample of three 
groups.  
 
Tableau 6a: Average Abnormal Return and the Student’s t-test - Group 1 
 
Date  AAR (%)  CAAR (%)  t -test -AAR  Pr > |t| 
-5  -0,52482  0,53740  -1.10  0.2983 
-4  0,64396  1,18135  1.02  0.3300 
-3  -0,18158  0,99977  -0.57  0.5810 
-2  1,13218  2,13196  2.30**  0.0441 
-1  0,95798  3,08994  1.03  0.3251 
0  1,72780  4,81773  1.69  0.1214 
1  2,08645  6,90419  1.66  0.1283 
2  -1,46580  5,43839  -0.98  0.3483 
3  1,43372  6,87211  1.67  0.1256 
4  0,62607  7,49818  0.62  0.5485 











































Tableau 6b: Average Abnormal Return and the Student’s t-test - Group 2 
 
Date  AAR (%)  CAAR (%)  t -test -AAR  Pr > |t| 
-5  0,72559  -1,83021  1.15  0.2618 
-4  0,37356  -1,45665  0.55  0.5876 
-3  -0,58865  -2,04530  -1.25  0.2230 
-2  -0,03440  -2,07969  -0.10  0.9229 
-1  0,60386  -1,47584  1.15  0.2629 
0  0,61650  -0,85934  1.02  0.3186 
1  -0,83092  -1,69026  -1.79*  0.0861 
2  0,50510  -1,18515  0.95  0.3506 
3  -0,44149  -1,62664  -0.72  0.4753 
4  0,65993  -0,96671  0.97  0.3391 
5  0,41007  -0,55664  0.83  0.4168 
 
Tableau 6c: Average Abnormal Return and the Student’s t-test - Group 3 
 
Date  AAR (%)  CAAR (%)  t -test -AAR  Pr > |t| 
-5  -1,01164  -5,21472  -2.72**  0.0186 
-4  -0,53309  -5,74781  -1.32  0.2122 
-3  -0,52739  -6,27520  -1.76  0.1033 
-2  -0,03971  -6,31491  -0.11  0.9117 
-1  0,47070  -5,84421  1.06  0.3117 
0  0,75353  -5,09068  0.88  0.3944 
1  -0,82219  -5,91287  -1.24  0.2400 
2  0,87692  -5,03595  2.09*  0.0588 
3  -0,80160  -5,83755  -1.17  0.2648 
4  0,83744  -5,00011  1.28  0.2253 
5  0,31082  -4,68929  0.46  0.6530 
 
At the date t = 0, the AAR of the three groups are positive. However, the ARR and 
the value of Student’s t-test of group 1 is the most highest (AAR t = 0G1 = 1.73 % ; AAR 
t = 0G2 = 0.62%) and AAR t = 0G3 = 0.75%) ; (Tt = 0G1 = 1.69 ; Tt = 0G2 = 1.02 and Tt = 0G3 = 
0.88).  These  results  indicate  that  the  relation  between  the  stock  returns  and  the 
sovereign wealth funds acquisitions at the announcement date is positive. However, 
greater the level of transparency of SWF, the signification of this relation is higher (Pr 
> |t|t = 0G1 = 12.14% ; Pr > |t|t = 0G2 = 31.86% et Pr > |t|t = 0G3 = 39.44%).   
 
The charts below present the average abnormal return and the cumulative average 
















































Chart 3a: Average Abnormal Return - Group 1 (%) 
 
 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The  results  of  the  CAAR  of  three  groups  are  very  different. The  tendency  of  the 
CAAR of Group 1 increase 6 days before the announcement date. The tendency of 
the CAAR of Group 2 increase 9 days after the announcement date and the tendency 
of the CAAR of Group 3 keeps on decreasing.  
 
We also calculate the CAAR and the Student t-test for different event windows over 
the period (t-40, t+20): 
 
Tableau 7: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return and the Student’s t-test  
for 3 groups 
 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3 
Event 
windows   CAAR (%)   t -test   CAAR (%)   t- test   CAAR (%)   t -test  
(-40,-20)  1,37289  0,58  -0,29171  -0,19  -2,93082  -1,82 
(-20,-10)  -2,12540  -0,82  -3,15850  -2,10  -3,01036  -1,86 
(-10,-5)  2,24332  1,91  -0,02803  -0,02  0,71382  0,78 
(-5,2)  4,37617  1,04  1,37064  0,91  -0,83287  -0,70 
(-3,3)  5,69076  2,50**   -0,16999  -0,11  -0,08974  -0,05 
(-2,2)  4,43861  1,33  0,86014  0,72  1,23925  1,32 
(-1,1)  4,77223  2,19*   0,38944  0,48  0,40204  0,35 
(2,10)  0,44310  0,12  2,33132  1,55  2,22700  0,83 
(-20,10)  6,41150  0,93  0,55492  0,20  -0,89513  -0,18 
(10,20)  -0,71430  -0,27  0,10799  0,05  0,93126  0,28 
(-40,20)  6,94201  1,10  0,47562  0,08  -4,43285  -0,57 
 
For the Group 1, the results of CAAR and Student t-test show that the CAAR for 7 
days (-3, +3) and 3 days (-1, +1) is significantly positive (signification at the 5% and 
10%). For the Group 2 and Group 3, around the announcement date, the CAAR for 
the 5 days (-2, +2) and 3 days (-1, +1) are positive. However, these values are low 
and  Student  t-test does  not  indicate  that  the  CAAR  for  these  event  windows  are 
significantly different with 0.  
 
Comparing the results of the sovereign wealth funds having the high transparency 
(Group 1) with those having the normal and low transparency (Group 2 and Group 3), 
we find that in the announcement date, the AAR of Group 1 is the most highest and 
this value decreases with the level of transparency of sovereign wealth funds. Around 
the announcement date, the CAAR of Group 1 is higher than that obtained in the 
case of Group 2 and Group 3.  
 
These  results  indicate  that  the  level  of  transparency  of  sovereign  wealth  funds 
influence the positive reaction of the announcement of the sovereign wealth funds 











































5. Conclusion  
 
Recently,  sovereign  wealth  funds  has  prompted  concern  among  economists, 
however, there has been very little academic research in this domain. We seek to 
test  whether  the  effect  of  SWF  investments  in  companies  on  balance  creates  or 
reduces value by examining the returns to target firm shareholders subsequent to 
these  investments.  By  dividing  the  sample  into  groups  depending  on  the  level  of 
transparency,  we  analyze  clearly  the  influence  of  transparency  of  SWFs  on  the 
market reaction to the SWFs investments, which was not focused in previous studies.   
 
We find that the short-term impact of SWF investments on the performance of the 
companies  in  which  they  invest  is  positive.  The  level  of  transparency  of  SWFs 
influence  the  positive  impact  of  SWF  investments  on  the  performance  of  those 
companies and the greater the level of transparency of SWF, the positive reaction is 
stronger.  
 
We hope that this study will enhance current understanding of SWF impact on the 
subsequent performance of the listed companies in which they invest and contribute 
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